This paper presents a mechanism for modeling timing, precedence, and data-consistency constraints on concurrently executing processes. The model allows durations and intervals between events to be speci ed. An algorithm is provided to detect schedules which may be unsafe with respect to the constraints. This work, motivated by the design and validation of autonomous error-recovery strategies on the Galileo spacecraft, appears to be applicable to a variety of asynchronous real-time systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a technique for detecting unsafe schedules involving the asynchronous software processes responsible for error recovery onboard spacecraft. These autonomous processes are constrained at the event level by timing, precedence, and data-consistency rules. A schedule (ordering of events) that violates these constraints can jeopardize the spacecraft and is labeled unsafe. Safety involves those correctness properties required by the static portions of the speci cations 3].
The motivation for this work comes from the di culty of analyzing the potential process interactions during spacecraft error recovery. A single failure on the spacecraft may at times trigger several di erent processes whose actions must then be compatible. More than one failure may also occur at a time, causing several error-recovery processes to be invoked. In addition, there is at any time a unique sequence of uplinked commands (instructions to subsystems) executing on the spacecraft. These commands must also be compatible with the actions of the error-recovery software.
During system development any possibility of interaction between a sequence of commands and the error-recovery software is carefully scrutinized. Often, with the limited software tools currently available, this is a tedious and di cult task. A tool such as the
II. ERROR-RECOVERY SCHEDULES
The Galileo spacecraft, enroute to a 1995 encounter with the planet Jupiter, is a complex system with many interactions among its computers, science instruments, and hardware components. The spacecraft is a hard real-time system in that failure to satisfy the timing constraints jeopardizes the correctness of the system's behavior as well as the spacecraft 36] .
The spacecraft is controlled by 28 processors, six of which form the shared-memory central Command and Data Subsystem. This subsystem interfaces with the other spacecraft subsystems through two buses and through hard-line connections. The central subsystem's architecture is based on ve virtual machines which hide the details of the system scheduling algorithms, interrupt handling, and multilevel message queues. The virtual machines operate on a 2/3-second granularity, producing relatively coarse-grained timing constraints on the spacecraft instructions.
Instructions, called commands, to the various subsystems, direct the spacecraft to take speci c actions at speci c times. Individual commands are assembled into groups of timetagged commands, called command sequences, which are periodically sent to the spacecraft from the ground. Command sequences are stored temporarily in the spacecraft's memory until the time comes for each command to execute.
Some command sequences are so critical to the success or failure of the spacecraft's mission that they are labeled critical sequences. The command sequences used at launch or to direct Galileo's science and engineering activities at Jupiter are examples of critical sequences.
A process is a sequence of commands, executed sequentially on a single processor, which may be initiated by ground command or in response to an error condition detected onboard. Command sequences are straight-line, while error-recovery processes may include branches. On spacecraft, however, the amount of branching is minimal.
The detection of unsafe schedules is aided by the fact that, unlike the situation in many other asynchronous systems, one process does not wait on another. The time at which a command is issued depends on the starting time of the process and on the internal structure of the process, not on the actions of other processes.
System-level software onboard the spacecraft monitors and responds to failures. The standard de nitions are used here of a failure as an event in which the behavior of the system deviates from its speci cation and of an error as an incorrect state of the system which must be remedied 31]. The error-recovery processes include those that respond to a loss of uplink or downlink communication, to thermal, power, or pressure anomalies, and to indicators regarding the health of the computers.
Should a failure occur during a non-critical sequence, a computer may cancel its activity. A critical sequence, however, must continue to execute even during system recovery. This requirement for concurrent execution of a critical sequence and error recovery drove much of the work presented here.
Constraints are imposed on the commands in an e ort to preclude con icting interactions among the possibly concurrent processes. Some commands can interfere with the e ect of other commands if they are executed too closely or too far apart in time. Certain commands must precede or follow other commands to accomplish the desired action. Some commands change the values of parameters used by other commands. Commands relating to power or propellant usage, to temperature or attitude control, to spacecraft or data modes, can endanger the collection of scienti c data, a subsystem, or the spacecraft if intervening commands issued by another process leave the spacecraft in an unexpected state.
To restrict the interactions that are allowed, constraints are placed on the interleavings of commands. The ight rules as well as other documented system-performance or operational speci cations forbid certain interactions as unsafe. The constraints also describe ordering (precedence) and timing relationships between commands that must be maintained even when processes containing those commands execute concurrently. This work addresses the task of trying to detect the con icting interactions{those interleavings of commands from asynchronous processes that may be unsafe. An unsafe schedule is one that de es the intercommand constraints.
Detecting undesirable interactions involving error-recovery processes is especially important since error-recovery software usually executes only when a failure has already been detected onboard the spacecraft. If a critical sequence is executing, the software must quickly (thus, autonomously) recon gure the spacecraft to the state that is the precondition for the next activity in the sequence.
In addition, because error-recovery software is responsive, it is asynchronous 7]. It may begin execution at any time. In fact, because the spacecraft often is most taxed during the most critical science activity, error-recovery software is most likely to execute when the spacecraft is active. Error-recovery capabilities not only increase the number of interactions among concurrently executing processes, but also tend to be executed at the busiest (in terms of process interactions) times. It is also the case that hardware failures due to physical damage tend to be clustered in time 29] .
The following assumptions hold: 1. Each process has a correct initial state, runs to completion, and produces correct results if executed alone. These assumptions exclude from consideration those cases in which the execution of a single process in isolation is unsafe. Such cases are properly detected by other methods prior to the use of the constraints checker presented here. The assumptions also exclude those cases in which a command constraint is not satis ed because one command was never issued due to a process abortion.
2. Simplifying assumptions about the Galileo architecture have been made with respect to the existence of backup hardware components and the possibility of rollbacks during critical sequences.
III. BACKGROUND
The problem addressed here is how to check that the concurrent execution of the asynchronous processes that cooperate during error recovery satisfy the precedence constraints, maintain data consistency (read/write) constraints, and satisfy the timing constraints.
The problem di ers in four signi cant ways from the focus of most of the research in this area:
1. The e ort here is to validate that all possible error-recovery schedules allowed by the spacecraft system are safe. Most research on scheduling concentrates on developing schedulers capable of choosing a single safe schedule.
2. The issue here is how to manage concurrency, not how to maximize it. The work addresses the question of whether the spacecraft already allows too much concurrency to guarantee that the constraints are always met. The spacecraft's scheduling software here is assumed to be already in place. Most research in concurrency instead addresses the question of how concurrency can be maximized in a future system within some given constraints.
3. Solutions to error recovery usually involve the notion of atomic actions, but a spacecraft command cannot be adequately modeled as an atomic action 20, 37] . A command is de ned to be an action. An issuance of a command is de ned to be an event, the instantiation of an action at a speci c point t in time. The issuance of a command is then assumed to occur instantaneously at this point in time. Following convention, this is stated as \command c occurs (or is issued) at time t." However, the activity or operation initiated by command c is usually not instantaneous. It is the duration of the activity to which the constraints often refer. For example, if c is a command to slew the scan platform to a particular position, the mechanical activity of moving the platform may take m minutes to complete. This is stated as \command c takes m minutes to execute."
The model described below allows the command's duration (the length of time required to execute the activity initiated by a command) to be attached to a command. Thus, a constraint of the form, \If command c j occurs, then the activity initiated by the occurrence of commmand c i must rst have completed," can be represented. This type of constraint is common on both spacecraft and other real-time systems. If the duration of the commanded activity is variable, it is limited by a worst-case time which is represented in the model. 4 . The solution here must take into account both precedence constraints and timing constraints. Precedence and timing are fundamentally di erent in that precedence does not require a notion of duration 30]. Most methods that currently exist to model precedence constraints do not incorporate timing requirements and so are inadequate for modeling the timing constraints on spacecraft 15, 24, 28] .
On the other hand, many techniques that are currently available to model timing constraints tend to ignore precedence constraints. Some techniques consider both timing and precedence constraints, but their de nition of timing constraints only in terms of periodic events (e.g., sampling rates), xed execution times for events, and deadline or timeliness requirements provides too limited a model for the aperiodic and interval timing constraints on spacecraft commands 8, 35, 36, 40] . The work described here brings together the study of real-time constraints with the study of precedence and data-consistency constraints.
A wide variety of powerful formalisms exists to model the speci cations and behavior of real-time concurrent systems. Many of these formalisms address to some degree the problem of checking timing constraints. However, none of the available methods readily translates to the domain of validating error recovery on spacecraft.
Petri net extensions model periodic events and deadlines 10, 21] . Automata-based methods model processes as a machine and try to prove a predicate (which may involve upper and lower time bounds on events) true for the reachable states in the machine 5, 13, 23] . Alternatively, processes can be repesented as timed B uchi automata (with upper time bounds on events) and the languages of timed traces that they accept can be investigated 2]. Real Time Logic models the timing aspects of a system speci cation to establish timing properties (periodic events and deadlines) 19]. Various extensions to temporal logic and temporal logic model checking have been developed to formally describe timing requirements and to verify automatically that the system satis es them 1, 9, 12, 17, 30] . These methods provide a good basis for specifying timing requirements but are either more ambitious (in that they model states) or less expressive (in that they only model a subset of timing constraints) than is needed for the spacecraft.
The work decribed here discusses many of the same timing issues addressed by recent work in interval temporal logic 11, 32, 34, 38] . However, the emphasis there is on specifying and verifying system requirements (what the spacecraft must do) while the emphasis here is on verifying operational constraints (what the spacecraft should not be allowed to do). For example, a system requirement often is stated in terms of a lower time bound (after which an event may occur) and an upper time bound (by which the event must have occurred). In contrast, an operational constraint often is stated in terms of an interval during which an event is permitted to occur (but perhaps won't) and outside of which interval the event must never occur. This distinction between a \hard" time constraint (an interval within which the action should be taken) and a \soft" time constraint (an interval within which the action may occur) 5] is often absent in formal models.
Autonomous error recovery onboard the spacecraft requires the spacecraft to have capabilities that it is only permitted to exercise subject to certain constraints. This paper o ers a partial solution to the problem of modeling quantitative timing constraints within the context of spacecraft error recovery.
IV. THE MODEL
The constraints that exist at the command level on the asynchronous execution of the spacecraft error recovery are modeled via a constraints graph. A constraints graph is a directed graph G=(V,E) in which each node c i , c j 2 V is labeled by a command and each edge e 2 E is labeled by a constraint. The edge (c i ; c j ) is also written c i ?! c j . For example, the timing constraint \A SCAN command shall not be sent within 10 seconds of a SLEW command" is modeled as a labeled edge from a node labeled SLEW to a node labeled SCAN (Fig. 1 ). is the subgraph composed only of precedence edges. It is required to be acyclic since a cycle of precedence constraints cannot be satis ed simultaneously.
Each node (representing a command) has associated with it the command mnemonic that identi es the command, the nominal (predicted) execution time of the command, if any, and the worst-case execution time of the command (the longest time for which the designers must plan). For example, the tape-rewind command on Galileo has a worst-case time eld of seven minutes.
Each edge has associated with it an edge type (described below), two optional time elds, t 1 and t 2 , a code indicating where the constraint is documented, and the variable, if the edge represents a data-consistency constraint.
Intercommand constraints are rules that govern the ordering or timing relationships between commands. There are two main classes of intercommand constraints: precedence constraints and timing constraints. Data-consistency constraints are typically represented as precedence constraints.
The classi cation into timing and precedence constraints corresponds loosely to the standard formal division of program correctness into safety properties and liveness properties. Safety properties can be stated informally as \nothing bad ever happens" and liveness properties as \something good eventually happens" 39].
A. Timing Constraints 2. Outside-interval constraint. \If c i occurs, then c j can only occur outside a range t 1 to t 2 from it." An example is, \The time separation between powering on the S-Band transmitter and powering on the X-Band transmitter shall be either less than one-half minute or greater than 6 minutes." A minimum-interval constraint is a special case of an outside-interval constraint with t 1 = 0, but is called out separately here for clarity of presentation.
3. Forbidden combination constraint. \If c i occurs, then c j cannot occur." This is a special case of an outside-interval constraint in which t 1 = -1 and t 2 = +1. An example is that if one of the two optics heaters is commanded on, then the other optics heater cannot be commanded on. This constraint is discussed further below.
4. Maximum-interval constraint. \If c i occurs, then c j can only occur within time t 1 of it." An example is, \A maximum of 6 minutes delay between spectrometer power o and replacement-heater power on can be tolerated."
5. Inside-interval constraint. \If c i occurs, then c j can only occur within a range t 1 to t 2 from it." An example is, \Each Low-Gain Antenna Motor power o command follows the on command no sooner than 9 seconds and no later than 30 seconds." A maximum-interval constraint is a special case of an inside-interval constraint with t 1 = 0 or of an outside-interval constraint with t 2 = +1.
A constraint of the form, \If c i occurs, then c j can only occur after it" can be expressed either as an outside-interval edge with t 1 = -1 and t 2 = 0, or as an inside-interval edge with t 1 = 0 and t 2 = +1.
In some cases a \nominal-to-worst-case" execution time may be documented for command c i . This pair of values indicates the expected time that it takes command c i to complete as well as the longest completion time for which the developers must plan.
The worst-case execution time for c i is an additional constraint on the time at which command c j can occur. In the case of a minimum-interval constraint with time parameter = t 1 , the worst-case execution time is added to t 1 in the graph. However, in the case of a maximum-interval timing constraint, adding the worst-case execution time to the initial timing constraint can mask a violation of the constraint by lessening the time interval between commands c i and c j . Instead, the nominal execution time is added to the timing constraint.
The cases for the inside-interval and the outside-interval edge types follow accordingly.
B. Precedence Constraints
While intercommand timing constraints are clearly safety properties, intercommand precedence constraints contain aspects of both safety and liveness properties 23]. Precedence constraints enforce an ordering of commands and so involve functional correctness, a concern of safety properties. Precedence constraints also involve liveness properties since they assert that if one command occurs, then another command must precede it: \If c j occurs, then a c i must precede it." An example is, \Spin Detector B can only be powered on after Spin Detector A is turned o ." Thus, whereas timing constraints assert that \every c i can only occur with timing relationship to c j ", precedence constraints assert that \for every c j , there must exist a c i that precedes it." If a timing constraint exists between commands c i and c j , either command can legally occur alone. However, if a precedence constraint exists between commands c i and c j , e.g., \If c j occurs, then c i must precede it," then c j cannot occur in isolation from c i .
Many constraints of the form \State A is a precondition for issuing command c j ," where state A can be commanded, can be adequately though imperfectly modeled as precedence constraints. An example is the rule that \10-Newton thruster rings must be performed with the scan platform in a safe position." In the context of the spacecraft, it su ces to ensure that the command to place the scan platform in a safe position precedes the command for thruster ring. By representing the state (scan platform in the safe position) by a command (place the scan platform in the safe position), the constraint can be modeled in the graph. If the required state cannot be commanded (e.g., \low-radiation environment"), then it cannot be modeled in the graph. A similar abstraction occurs with forbidden-combination constraints. For example, the constraints graph approximates a constraint forbidding the issuance of a command to turn on optics heater B if optics heater A is on by means of an edge that forbids the issuance of a command to turn on optics heater B following the issuance of a command to turn on optics heater A. This places a restriction on the schedules that will be considered legal. For example, if a command to turn o heater A occurs between the two \ON" commands, the schedule will be agged as illegal by this method. Because the tool is used not for mechanical veri cation but as an analysis aid during development, these occasional false positives have been tolerated as easily resolvable by subsequent inspection of the code.
C. Data-Consistency Constraints
Data-consistency constraints involve restrictions placed on the order of commands when two or more processes access the same variable and at least one process changes the value of the variable 4]. In such cases a concurrent execution of the processes can lead to a result di erent from the sequential execution of the processes. To forestall the data inconsistency that could result from this, a data-consistency constraint is used to specify the order in which the commands that read/write the variable must occur. Such a data-consistency constraint is expressed as a precedence constraint.
For example, on Galileo the Commanded-Maneuver-Status variable is updated by the command sequence before the thruster burn that places Galileo in orbit around Jupiter. If a failure occurs adjacent to the time of the burn, this variable is read by an error-recovery process to determine the appropriate response. The documented constraint requires that the update precede the read. This write/read constraint is modeled in the graph by adding a precedence edge from a node representing the update to a node representing the read.
The constraints checker does not model the state of the spacecraft. Instead, it accepts as input several sequences of commands (the processes) and a set of rules (the constraints graph) and looks for schedulings in which the concurrent execution of those processes violates a constraint. Consequently, if some other process that was not input to the constraints checker issues a command, the constraints checker does not`see' the e ect of the command.
V. THE CONSTRAINTS CHECKER ALGORITHM Section IV described how each edge represents a constraint that must hold between the commands which are the edge's endpoints. Each constraint is translated in the constraints graph into an edge type (precedence, minimum interval, etc.).
The constraints graph and a set of processes (time-tagged lists of commands) are input to the constraints checker. The constraints checker algorithm xes one process' timeline and determines the range of start times that the xed timeline and the constraint represented by each edge impose on the other processes' start times. Each edge type is associated with an algebraic predicate which relates the time of issuance of the commands which are the edge's endpoints to the constraint represented by the edge. The constraints checker tests whether the appropriate predicate holds for each edge in the constraints graph. An edge which fails to satisfy the required predicate is agged. In that case some scheduling of the processes can cause the constraint represented by that edge to be violated.
Since the constraints graph is sparse, an adjacency list representation is used to store the graph 27]. Inputting a process to the constraints checker consists of adding a two-way pointer from each command in the process to the node in the constraints graph that represents the command. Each command has an associated time tag. The command represented by a node may occur in any or all of the processes. Some processes may have multiple occurrences of the command.
The commands in the various possible paths through a process are interleaved. This is possible because only interactions between distinct processes are analyzed. Furthermore, the tree of possible paths is small since command sequences are straight-line processes and errorrecovery processes display little branching. In practice, the control structure of the spacecraft processes is simple enough to allow the complete unraveling of the process constructs.
To x the timeline, one process' start time (thus, timeline) is xed and the other processes' timelines are moved relative to that xed process. If one of the processes is a command sequence, it is the natural choice for the xed timeline since sequences have absolute start times. Otherwise, the process with the lowest processor identi cation (pid) is chosen.
Let (c i ; c j ) be an edge, with process P i issuing command c i and process P j issuing command c j . If an edge violation occurs as the result of interleaving several processes, that same edge violation still occurs as the result of interleaving the two processes that issue the edge's nodes. Any interleaving of two processes that can occur via the concurrent execution of more than these two processes can occur with the concurrent execution of only these two processes. It thus su ces to check for each edge every ordered pair (c The variables S j , E j , L j , and j are de ned for P j analogously. S v , E v , and L v refer to the actual, earliest, and latest start times, respectively, for P v , the process whose timeline is variable.
For the sake of clarity, the description of the algorithm in Fig. 2 assumes that E i , E j , L i , and L j have been provided with initial values by the user. If the user has not provided these values then the constraints checker cannot detect violations of edges and will not issue warning ags to the user. However, useful information regarding the range of allowable start times for processes can still be accumulated and output, as is described below.
A. The Algorithm
The constraints checker (Fig. 2 ) distinguishes between precedence edges and time-constrained edges. A precedence edge requires that every c j be preceded by a c i . The algorithm in e ect examines all instances of c i for each instance of c j . To capture the existential quanti er in the predicate for a precedence edge (\There exists a c i that precedes this c j "), the constraints checker refers to information from the user. The user decides which of the processes can be considered to always execute in the current scenario. A command c i in a process that may or may not execute cannot with certainty satisfy a precedence edge.
The variable Gc i is the earliest time by which a process that is guaranteed to execute can guarantee that c i will occur. If P i is a sequence, Gc i is the timetag of the earliest instance of command c i in the sequence. For example, in analyzing the precedence constraint on Galileo that c 22 must precede c 24 , the Gc i for c 22 is the xed time at which the command sequence issues c 22 , namely the value 2:00:38 (see Appendix). If P i is not a sequence, then Gc i is an optional, user-provided value (in practice, often equal to E i + i ). If the user can make no guarantee regarding when an instance of c i will occur, then Gc i is set to an arbitrarily large integer. The constraints checker uses Gc i to detect a possible violation of a precedence edge by requiring that c j not occur before Gc i .
Given that S j is the actual start time of the process issuing c j , j is the time interval from S j until command c j is issued, and E j is the earliest time at which process P j can start, the command c j occurs at S j + j when S j is xed. However, when S i (the start time of the process issuing c i ) is xed and the value of S j is not xed, the algorithm then considers the earliest time at which a c j can occur|namely at E j + j . If the earliest time at which a c i can occur precedes or equals Gc i , then the edge is agged. This means that the constraint that the edge represents is not always satis ed by the process interactions.
As noted in Section IV, data-consistency constraints are modeled as precedence edges. The constraints checker algorithm thus validates data-consistency constraints by testing those edges.
A time-constrained edge requires that if command c i occurs, then command c j does not occur within some time interval. Whereas a precedence edge requires a c i for every c j , in a time-constrained edge the presence of one command does not require the presence of the other. The predicates for the time-constrained edges are of the form \every c j that follows this c i must satisfy a certain timing constraint."
For a timing constraint, de ne the time interval Poss = E v , L v ] to be the range of possible times at which the process whose timeline is variable may start according to the user. De ne Safe to be the set of safe times at which that process may start, that is, the set of all times T that satisfy the predicate for that edge type. A time-constrained edge is satis ed if the set of possible times for the process whose timeline is variable is contained within the set of safe times for that process: Poss Safe (Fig. 2) . if P i is xed fsee Fig. 3 De ne to be the edge type of the edge being checked. The edge type =0 if the edge is of type precedence; =1 if the edge is of type minimum-interval (i.e., \command c j cannot occur within time t 1 of command c i "); =2 if the edge is of type outside-interval (\command c j cannot follow command c i by more than time t 1 but less than time t 2 "); =3 if the edge is of type forbidden-combination (\command c j cannot occur if command c i does"); =4 if the edge is of type maximum-interval (\command c j cannot occur more than time t 1 after command c i "); and =5 if the edge is of type inside-interval (\command c j cannot occur within time t 1 of command c i or more than time t 2 after c i "). Thus, 2 f0,1,2,3,4,5g. For simplicity of exposition, both time parameters t 1 and t 2 have been given in the algorithm, although not all edge types use both these parameters.
Each of the ve time-constrained edge types ( 6 = 0) has associated with it a predicate that is used to determine the set Safe (Fig. 3) . 
B. Output
The constraints checker makes an assertion about the allowable start times of the process whose timeline is not xed. It makes this assertion based on the edge type currently being surveyed, on the constraint represented by the edge, on the o set between the processes' start times and their issuances of c i and c j , and on the xed start time of one process. If the constraint checker's assertion concerning when the other processes should start is inconsistent with the user-provided range of start times, then the edge is agged.
In order for the user to be able to reconstruct the concurrent execution which caused an edge to be agged (i.e., the intercommand constraint that the edge represents to be violated), the constraints checker outputs the identity of any agged edge and its nodes, as well as the identity of the two processes whose concurrent execution caused the constraint violation.
If the edge was agged due to erroneous information in one of the edge or node labels, the user can readily correct the input data and run the constraints checker again to verify the adequacy of the correction. If the edge is agged due to a problem with the existing errorrecovery schedule, the data output with the agged edge helps the user identify the problem. The user responds by shifting the processes' timelines or by curtailing the concurrency that allowed the intercommand constraint to be violated. The goal is to adjust or limit the concurrent execution of the processes so that the edge will not be agged in a subsequent run.
If an edge is not agged either because the calculated start time is within the userprovided time range or because the user did not provide a range of possible start times, then the predicate is stored. Each pair of processes that forms the nodes of an edge yields a predicate relating the xed start time of one process to the variable start time of the other process. As the edges are considered one-by-one in the constraints checker, the constraints that the edges impose on the scheduling of the processes accumulate. After all the edges have been surveyed, the constraints checker computes for every distinct pair of processes the range of safe start times of one process relative to the other. Within this time interval the intercommand constraints are satis ed.
The notion of precedence constraints presented here is restricted in two ways. First, precedence constraints have looked only backward in time: \if command c j occurs, then there exists an instance of command c i that precedes it." Secondly, precedence constraints have contained no timing information about the events they order. If the constraints to be modeled make it appropriate to do so, both of these restrictions can be relaxed with only minor adjustments to the algorithm. To allow precedence constraints to look forward in time (\every instance of c i is followed by some instance of c j "), a new variable, Gc i l, is de ned and used in place of Gc i in the algorithm. The variable Gc i l is de ned to be the latest time at which a c i might occur. In addition, E i (when P j is xed) and S i (when P i is xed) replace S j and E i , respectively.
Adding timing information to precedence constraints (e.g., \if c j occurs, then some c i must precede it by at least time t"), blurs the useful distinction between ordering requirements and timing requirements. However, the distinction between existential constraints (\there exists a c i that precedes each c j ") and universal constraints (\every c j can only occur in a speci c time interval relative to c i ") is preserved. The algorithm is thus readily extended to check these additional types of precedence constraints if the application domain requires them. Similarly, the timing details of a speci c system architecture can be incorporated into the predicates if the user so wishes. For example, on the Galileo spacecraft the commands issued by system-fault-protection processes to other subsystems in a given process cycle are then transferred to output queues in the following cycle. How long a command then spends in a queue depends upon which queue it is in, the type of command, the number of commands issued proximate to that time, which process issued the command, and the operating mode, among other factors. The worst-case time by which each command will be output from the queue can be calculated and this delay included in the algorithm. On Galileo, the granularity of the time units involved in command sequencing (2/3 seconds) is large enough that architectural details were not included in the constraints checker.
C. Time Complexity and Optimizations
The time complexity of the constraints-checker algorithm is
, where E is the set of edges, n is the number of processes, and k is de ned as follows.
Let P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :; P n be the processes under consideration, (c i ; c j ) be an edge, E p = the set of precedence edges, E t = the set of timing and forbidden edges, c i (x) = the number of instances of a xed c i in process P x , k i = ). Since the constraints graph is sparse (Galileo has over 1200 commands and only 284 ight rules), j E j will be small. Since there are usually very few instances of each command per process, k will also be small. On the Galileo spacecraft k is slightly greater than 1. Although the analysis of the time complexity assumes that every command will be issued by every process, in actuality only those edges for which both nodes are issued by the input processes are checked. The user can further reduce the running time by pruning the constraints graph to include only those nodes (commands) present in the processes under consideration and only those edges (rules) which are of interest. The disadvantage of pruning the graph is that edges which should be checked may be accidentally deleted.
The number of processes, n, will usually be quite small. Since the constraints checker functions primarily as a visualization and validation tool for those interactions that cannot be easily grasped using current techniques, a typical run consists of a critical command sequence and a few error-recovery programs. Galileo, for example, has 26 system-level error-recovery programs, many of which cannot execute concurrently with each other.
D. An Example
The following example from the Galileo spacecraft illustrates how the constraints graph and the algorithm function. The scenario to be analyzed addresses the complicated timing issues involved when the Probe Relay/Jupiter Orbital Insertion (Relay/JOI) critical sequence (resident in the Command and Data Subsystem or CDS computer) issues commands to the AACS (Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem) hardware that presuppose that the AACS is in a certain con guration. If the AACS computer experiences a Power-OnReset failure during Jupiter Orbital Insertion, error-recovery responses in the CDS, jointly called AACS INIT, must quickly recon gure the AACS to the con guration required by the sequence. This is accomplished by dividing the critical sequence into a number of segments, each consisting of a distinct AACS con guration and an activity (e.g., the 400-Newton burn) needed for the completion of the sequence 16, 33] . Each segment of the sequence has an AACS INIT error-recovery response tailored to it, designed to bring the AACS back to the state required by the sequence at that point. The synchronization of the segments of the sequence with the AACS INIT error-recovery responses is accomplished via a shared ag, updated by the sequence, that determines which AACS INIT response will be invoked. Among the timing issues that must be taken into account is the fact that it is possible for commands to be issued from an AACS INIT error-recovery response at a time earlier than they would have occurred in the sequence if an AACS INIT response had not occurred. There are ten synchronized error-recovery responses in AACS INIT. This example examines six of these responses (AACS INIT3 through AACS INIT8) and the one-and-a-half-hour portion of the Relay/JOI sequence that most closely brackets JOI. (The entire sequence issues commands over a ten-day period.) The portion of the sequence analyzed here contains 70 commands, several of them issued redundantly. The six error-recovery responses together contain 237 lines of code, almost all of them commands. Many of these commands are issued in more than one response. No assumption was made here that each process satis ed the intercommand constraints if executed in isolation, so commands in the same process as well as in di erent processes were checked against the constraints.
The constraints graph input to the constraints checker (Fig. 4) consists of 40 nodes and 40 edges 6, 26] . Of these edges, 20 are precedence edges and 20 are timing edges. The commands represented by the nodes address four di erent spacecraft subsystems. Only intercommand constraints involving the commands found in the seven processes discussed in this example are shown in the gure. (The entire constraints graph for Galileo would contain on the order of 1200 nodes and under 1000 edges).
Each command, represented in the spacecraft code as a mnemonic (e.g., \7BIGZ" for the command to initiate the 400-Newton engine burn), is labeled in the example with a positive integer for ease of explanation. 7BIGZ, for example, is labeled c 24 . Fig. 4 shows several precedence constraints (unlabeled) and several timing constraints (labeled \t") involving command 7BIGZ. The edge from node c 37 to c 24 , for example, represents the precedence constraint that if a 7BIGZ command occurs, then a 7ACCLON command (Accelerometers On) must have preceded it.
The results were as follows. Seven of the 40 edges in the constraints graph were agged by the constraints checker (see the Appendix for details). Four of the agged edges were precedence edges and three were timing edges. One precedence edge was agged because a global variable could in some schedules be used before it was updated. Two other edges were agged because a certain command that was required to precede another did not occur.
(One of these violations was later traced to outdated documentation). Another agged edge was, in fact, not violated but appeared to be, since the required tail-node command appeared six hours before the associated head-node command. Two of the three timing edges that were agged involved a timing discrepancy between the requirements and the code. The third timing edge that was agged resulted from the unforeseen consequence of a data eld taking on a value which is possible, but forbidden in operations.
Another eight errors, involving incorrect or inconsistent documentation, were identi ed during construction of the constraints graph. Seven of these eight errors were signi cant enough to have caused inaccuracies in the constraints graph and in the results of the constraints checker. It is not surprising that the constraints checker is only as accurate as the constraints provided to it. What was unexpected was the number of errors discovered during the modeling process itself.
The intercommand constraint violations agged by the constraints checker (in boldface in the graph) involved either discrepancies between the constraints and the code or unforeseen consequences of unlikely but possible error-recovery scenarios. The constraints checker appears to be useful in enhancing the developers' ability to visualize abnormal scenarios and in agging timing or precedence constraint violations that occur only in some subset of the possible schedules.
The code analyzed here was a baseline version, rather than the most current ight version. This choice was made in order to provide code that had been well thought out, but not yet thoroughly tested. It is at this intermediate stage of the development process, when the intercommand constraints have been initially documented but the details of the design and the timing are still evolving, that the constraints checker may be most e ective.
VI. FUTURE WORK AND OTHER APPLICATIONS
A version of the constraints checker is currently under development for use on the Comet Rendezvous/Asteriod Flyby (CRAF) spacecraft and the Cassini spacecraft. The initial use will be as a software development tool, analyzing and testing error-recovery processes and schedules involving their concurrent execution. Later, as command sequences are developed, the constraints checker will incorporate them into the error-recovery scenarios that it checks.
Experience on Galileo indicates that the early detection of signi cant inconsistencies between the design and the constraints will be the constraint checker's major bene t. It can evaluate the system's ability to satisfy precisely expressed timing and precedence properties early in the design of the software.
The constraints checker currently limits the kinds of intercommand constraints that can be modeled. Because its original focus was on solving a spacecraft problem, the existing core su ces to check most of the intercommand constraints on spacecraft. However, extension to other applications requires expansion of the constraints de nition. Speci cally, plans include extending it to include \follows" as well as \precedes," attaching times to precedence constraints, including Boolean operators in the constraints, and providing more exibility in how similar commands with distinct parameters can be grouped. Currently, since only interactions among processes that execute correctly in isolation are analyzed, an edge is never agged due to its nodes being issued from di erent paths of a single process. To drop the assumption that isolated processes execute correctly, a naming mechanism is being incorporated into the constraints checker. It will associate a path name with each command and, when an edge is agged, test that both nodes are issued in the same path through the process. Finally, steps need to be taken towards automating the creation of the constraints graph.
Some issues that remain to be investigated are the modeling of an initial state in the form of a history of earlier events, the representation of an ordinal iteration of a command (\the second instance of c j "), and the addition of variable times (where the time parameter is not a constant). Current research, especially in interval temporal logic, continues to identify additional constraint types. The challenge is to incorporate those features into the constraints checker without eroding its focus and usefulness in accurately detecting unsafe schedules in existing or developing systems.
The techniques outlined here are suitable for addressing related problems in domains other than spacecraft. The design of system-level error-recovery in event-driven systems often involves the analysis of how temporal constraints are a ected by the concurrent execution of processes with unpredictable start times. Such issues are readily investigated with the constraints checker.
Critical software applications such as many process-control, ight-control, command-andcontrol, or avionics systems involve aperiodic tasks and time-interval speci cations. Frequently, however, only periodic and deadline speci cations can be modeled and tested with the tools currently in use. The methods described above o er the capability to quickly and accurately model and check that even aperiodic and interval constraints among events will always hold in the system. For these reasons, interest has been expressed in the use of the constraints checker as an embeddable module in other simulation or executable-speci cation tools.
The constraints checker is also suited to operational situations where, as on the spacecraft, a portion of the control software is regularly replaced. On the spacecraft, the sequences of commands are examples of this \temporary" software. On the space station, for example, procedures to sequence activities outside the astronauts' responsibilities will need to be sent from the ground. The operational di culties of quickly checking that new or temporary software will not con ict with the prior or \permanent" software can be eased by the availability of a constraints-graph model and constraints checker.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown how to construct a constraints graph to model the precedence, timing, and data-consistency constraints for which it has been historically di cult to design. The constraints graph provides a means of visualizing the command constraints that must be satis ed by every concurrent execution of processes. This paper has also presented an algorithm that, given a constraints graph and a set of processes, detects possibly unsafe schedulings of the processes.
The error-recovery scenarios chosen to test the algorithm involved failures during the execution of the critical command sequence that controls Galileo's arrival at Jupiter. The activities of the processes that must cooperate during error recovery are highly constrained due to the complexity and time criticality of the engineering and science during the planetary encounter. There are thus many opportunities for unsafe error-recovery schedules. The constraints checker o ers a way to discover such process interactions early in the software development process.
The constraints checker algorithm is designed speci cally to help answer the question of whether existing system-level error recovery is adequate. It o ers a exible, embeddable, and relatively simple alternative to simulation of error-recovery scenarios. In the context of the spacecraft, the algorithm identi es the unexpected e ects resulting from the interleaving of error-recovery processes and mission-critical sequences of commands. In a broader context, the research presented here is part of an ongoing e ort to investigate the behavior of concurrently executing processes subject to precedence and timing constraints.
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APPENDIX
This appendix provides the details of the example described in Section V.D. The sequence attached an absolute time tag to each command. The other six processes attached an o set to each command, measured in \minor frames" (2/3 second) from the process' start.
For an edge (c i , c j ) in the graph, node c i is called the tail and node c j is called the head of the edge. Due to the fact that the Jupiter Orbital Insertion (JOI) sequence provides time tags relative to the probe entry rather than to the start of the command sequence, a time tag attached to a command in the sequence equals (S i + i ) when the command is a tail node and equals (S j + j ) when the command is a head node. For each command issued by the sequence, Gc i for that command is the sequence's time tag for that command.
The user provided the algorithm with the earliest and latest start times of the AACS INIT responses (Fig. 5) . These are the earliest and latest times at which, if an AACS PowerOn-Reset occurred at that point, the synchronization ag would cause an invocation of this response.
Each instance of a command in every process was linked to its node in the constraints graph, if such a node existed. Commands not involved in intercommand constraints did not appear in the graph and were not checked by the algorithm.
There were 20 precedence edges in the graph. Nine of these were discarded by the constraints checker because there was no occurrence of the commands represented by the edges' heads in the processes input to the checker. Each instance of the head in the other eleven precedence edges was checked by the constraints checker algorithm. There were a total of 46 such instances.
The precedence edge (c 22 ,c 24 ) is one which the algorithm agged as not satis ed. There were four instances of c 24 : one in the sequence at 2:00:42 (hrs:min:sec), one in the sequence at 2:00:44, one in AACS INIT6 (abbreviated P 6 ), and one in AACS INIT7 (abbreviated P 7 ). There was only one instance of c 22 , namely in the sequence. From Fig. 5 , E j = 2:00:13.3 for P 6 and E j = 2:37:49.3 for P 7 . The value of Gc i = 2:00:38 (the time at which c 22 was issued in the sequence). From the code, when c j = c 24 , j = 14.7 seconds for P 6 and j = 16 seconds for P 7 . For the sequence, the value of S j + j = 2:00:42 (the actual time that the command was issued).
In the cases in which the sequence issued c 24 , the predicate required that S j + j Gc i . Since 2:00:44 > 2:00:42 2:00:38, this was trivially satis ed.
In the case in which P 6 issued c 24 , the predicate required that E j + j Gc i . But since E j + j = 2:00:13.3 + 0:00:14.7 = 2:00:28 < Gc i , the constraints checker agged the edge with the information that if P 6 issued c 24 , it could issue it before the sequence issued c 22 , thus violating a precedence constraint.
Finally, when P 7 issued c 24 , E j + j = 2:37:49.3 + 0:00:16 = 2:38:05.3 Gc i , so precedence was preserved.
The other ten precedence edges were similarly analyzed by the constraints checker. Three other precedence edges were agged because in each case, one or more instances of the command represented by the head node occurred but no instance of the command represented by the tail node preceded them, as required. In one of these cases, analysis showed that the tail did occur in the part of the sequence that was not provided to the example. In another case, the documented constraint was incorrect. In the other case, a global variable could be used before it was updated, contrary to the constraint.
There were 20 timing edges in the graph. Fifteen of these were dismissed by the constraints checker since there was no occurrence of both head and tail nodes in the processes. The algorithm computed whether the timing predicates were ever violated for the remaining ve timing edges in which both nodes appeared in the code. For these edges the algorithm tested every pair of instances of commands represented by the nodes, a total of 83 pairs.
The inside-interval timing edge (c 24 , c 32 ) is one which the constraints checker agged as not satis ed. There were four instances of c 24 and three instances of c 32 in the processes, yielding twelve pairs of instances of (c 24 , c 32 ) to check. Since the edge type was an insideinterval constraint, Safe = those values for which the predicate S i + i + t 1 < S j + j < S i + i + t 2 held. From the graph, t 1 = 0:00:22 and t 2 = 0:00:22.7. Since the constraint referred to when c 24 completed (the maximum burn time), rather than to when it was issued, the execution time of 0:45:54 from the constraints graph was added to t 1 and t 2 .
One of the twelve pairs checked involved the case in which P 6 issued c 24 at i = 0:00:12.7 and the sequence issued c 32 at 2:46:42. Safe = the process start times that satisfy the predicate S i + i + execution time + t 1 < S j + j < S i + i + execution time + t 2 . Then Safe = the process start times that satisfy S i + 00:46:28.7 < 2:46:42 < S i + 00:46:29.4. Thus, Safe = 2:00:12.6, 2:00:13.3]. However, Poss, the interval of possible times at which 20 P 6 , the process that issued c 24 . Again, Poss 6 Safe, so the edge was agged and the additional information about cases that could violate the constraint was added to the output. The analysis of the other ten pairs followed similarly. In all, 129 instances of edges were checked by the algorithm, and another 24 edges discarded because the head and tail nodes were not found in the processes. From these calculations, the seven edges described above were agged as representing intercommand constraints that were not always satis ed. 
